Event Overview
Public agencies are taking actions to promote multimodal transportation, while the emergence of multimodality raises challenges. With diverse service designs and
operational strategies, modeling, evaluating, and managing such systems from a holistic
perspective becomes more difficult.
Regulators require modeling tools capable of handling multiple stakeholders and various operational strategies. To incorporate different types of operational strategies, we extend the traditional
assignment game into a nonlinear mixed-integer programming model that integrates
both fixed-route and on-demand services.
The model captures decision-making from
both travelers and operators to form a market equilibrium and we propose a stochastic assignment game and define its core. We further adapted this approach into a stochastic Stackelberg game to model urban mobility markets, where the regulator is the leader and stochastic coalitions of travelers and operators form as the followers.
SPEAKER
Bingqing Liu received her Ph.D. in Transportation Systems at Tandon School of Engineering, New York University. She is currently a postdoctoral scholar at UCLA, affiliated with the Center of Excellence on New Mobility and Automated Vehicles. Her research focuses on network modeling of multimodal transportation systems, with game theory, operations research, and simulation approaches.
