conference paper

Envy-free pricing for collaborative consumption of supply in transportation systems

Papers selected for the 22nd international symposium on transportation and traffic theory

Publication Date

January 1, 2017

Abstract

Consumption of supply in transportation systems has generally always followed a First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) rule. This article proposes new control policies based on the concept of envy-freeness which outperform FCFS in both efficiency and fairness. We call an allocation envy-free when no agent feels any other agent’s allocation to be better than their own, at the current price. Envy-free allocations are thus considered fair. Several new contributions are made: we first present a conceptual theoretical supply demand framework which formally introduces the new supply paradigm. We propose and simulate a new problem, queue jumping operations on highways, in which vehicles can skip positions in a queue and compensate the overtaken vehicles with a payment. We present a new concept, dynamic envy-freeness, and provide a new envy ranking criterion, Constant Elasticity of Substitution Envy Intensity (CESEI) that is applied to PEXIC, an exchange-based traffic signal control scheme. (C) 2017 The Authors. Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation
Roger Lloret-Batlle and R. Jayakrishnan (2017) “Envy-free pricing for collaborative consumption of supply in transportation systems”, in . Mahmassani, H and Nie, Y and Smilowitz, K (ed.) Papers selected for the 22nd international symposium on transportation and traffic theory. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV (Transportation research procedia), pp. 772–789. Available at: 10.1016/j.trpro.2017.05.043.