Abstract

Consider a community with individuals who consume a private good and use a congestible facility. Without a congestion fee, use of the congestible facility will exceed the socially optimal level. We show that under some conditions this externality problem can be solved by income redistribution. Indeed, the poor can gain from a redistribution to the rich.

Abstract

California has authorized four toll roads to be constructed and operated by private groups, and it is considering more. Construction on a similar 14-mile project in Virginia will begin in 1992. Florida, Texas, and Colorado are considering proposals for private toll roads, and there is talk of a 500-mile private connection between Chicago and Kansas City. Outside the United States, private groups are operating toll roads in France and Italy. Indeed, the idea of private toll roads is making a comeback.

We say “comeback” because many regions of the United States were once laced with private toll roads. In the early 1800s turnpiking was the leading form of transportation improvement. At mid-century an elaborate system of short turnpikes and plank roads served as feeders to the canals and railroads. In Colorado and California private toll roads served the early mining camps. By the year 1900 scores of rustic toll roads continued to traverse rural areas nation-wide. During the 19th century at least 2,000 private companies operated toll roads.

Abstract

Jobs-housing balance has become a major planning and public policy issue. Despite its popularity and apparent acceptance among public policy makers as a solution for traffic congestion and air pollution problems, there is little consensus on what jobs-housing balance means and little evidence that a jobs-housing balance policy would have any significant effect on these problems. The jobs-housing balance policy is premised on the idea that job and housing location choices are closely linked, and that policy intervention is required to achieve a balance of housing and jobs. Existing evidence suggests that the relationship between where people choose to live and work is complex, and may have little to do with job access considerations. Further, patterns of urban growth and travel indicate that balancing occurs as part of the urban development process. It is concluded that jobs-housing balance is not an effective solution for traffic congestion and air pollution concerns. Rather, these problems are better addressed in a more direct way.

Abstract

The adoption of congestion pricing depends fundamentally upon drivers’ willingness to pay to reduce travel time during the congested morning peak period. Using revealed preference data from a congestion pricing demonstration project in San Diego, we estimate that willingness to pay to reduce congested travel time is higher than previous stated preference results. Our estimate of median willingness to pay to reduce commute time is roughly $30 per hour, although this may be biased upward by drivers’ perception that the toll facility provides safer driving conditions. Drivers also use the posted toll as an indicator of abnormal congestion and increase their usage of the toll facility when tolls are higher than normal.

Abstract

Some road-pricing demonstrations use an approach called “value pricing”, in which travelers can choose between a free but congested roadway and a priced roadway. Recent research has uncovered a potentially serious problem for such demonstrations: in certain models, second-best tolls are far lower than those typically charged, and the welfare gains from profit maximization are small or even negative. That research, however, assumes that all travelers are identical and it therefore neglects the benefits of product differentiation, by which people with different values of time can choose a suitable cost/quality combination. Using a model with two user groups, we find that accounting for heterogeneity in value of time is important in evaluating constrained policies, and improves the relative performance of policies that offer differential prices. Nevertheless, for most of the reasonable range of heterogeneity, second-best pricing produces far fewer benefits than pricing both roadways optimally, and profit-maximizing tolls are so high that overall welfare is reduced from the no-toll baseline.

Abstract

Understanding attitudes held by the public about the acceptability, fairness, and effectiveness of congestion pricing systems is crucial to the planning and evaluation of such systems. In this study, joint models of attitude and behavior are developed to explain how both mode choice and attitudes regarding the San Diego 1-15 Congestion Pricing Project differ across the population. Results show that some personal and situational explanations of opinions and perceptions are attributable to mode choices, but other explanations are independent of behavior. With respect to linkages between attitudes and behavior, none of the models tested found any significant effects of attitude on choice; all causal links were from behavior to attitudes.